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Secure network: certificates, identity and PasspointAuthentication

Managed PKI or Active Directory Certificate Services for WiFi certificates

You will be able to decide whether to run Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) or a managed PKI for EAP-TLS staff WiFi. You can map your device mix, CA ownership, key-custody policy and server refresh date to a recommendation. You will also know how to migrate in phases without a WiFi outage.

15 min read

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Use a managed PKI when your devices enrol through an MDM and nobody owns the CA full-time; use Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) when a healthy two-tier hierarchy already runs on-premises. In both cases the RADIUS server checks the same EAP-TLS certificate (RFC 5216). For most multi-site estates, a managed PKI on Purple's secure network is the lower-effort default.

Should you run a managed PKI or AD CS for WiFi certificates?

Both options produce the same artefact: an X.509 certificate that a device presents when it joins staff WiFi. The difference is who builds, runs and repairs the machinery behind that certificate.

A few terms first.

  • Public key infrastructure (PKI) is the system that issues, renews and revokes certificates.
  • Certificate authority (CA) is the part of the PKI that signs the certificates.
  • IEEE 802.1X is the port-based access control standard your access points enforce.
  • RADIUS is the authentication server that accepts or rejects each connection.
  • EAP-TLS is the 802.1X method that authenticates with a device certificate instead of a password.

The rule of thumb: run your own CA only when someone owns it as a job. If nobody does, let a managed PKI carry the work.

Three conditions keep AD CS in the frame:

  1. A named owner runs a two-tier hierarchy with an offline root, current certificate revocation lists (CRLs) and documented templates.
  2. Most WiFi devices are domain-joined Windows machines that receive certificates through Group Policy autoenrolment.
  3. A policy or contract requires CA keys on infrastructure you operate, usually a hardware security module (HSM).

If the first two hold, keeping AD CS is understandable. When a contract requires CA keys on infrastructure you operate, AD CS meets that constraint. If either of the first two fails, a managed PKI on Purple wins on effort.

This decision sits on the secure network. That network is one of three that Purple Access runs on the access points you already own. The open network handles captive portal sign-in and BYOD onboarding. The xPSK network gives each device or resident its own key. On all three networks, identity sets the virtual LAN (VLAN). That identity comes from Microsoft Entra ID, Okta or Google Workspace. For the wider design, read our secure network guide to certificates, identity and Passpoint.

Which way does your estate fall?

Answer the questions in order. The first question moves devices that cannot hold a certificate onto a different network before the PKI choice arises.

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Two questions do most of the work. Does the CA have an owner? Where do your devices live? If you answer "no owner" or "mostly in an MDM", the PKI choice is already made.

Which option fits each kind of estate?

The table maps common multi-site estates to a recommendation and the condition that drives it.

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Worked example: a 40-site hotel group with an orphaned CA

Situation. Staff laptops and phones were enrolled in Microsoft Intune. A contractor had built an AD CS issuing CA and then left. The Network Device Enrollment Service (NDES), which carries SCEP requests to AD CS, ran on a single server at head office. The access points were Cisco Meraki. Several hotels still used a shared staff password.

What was done. Staff WiFi moved to EAP-TLS on Purple's secure network with a managed PKI. One Intune SCEP profile delivered a certificate to every staff device. In the Meraki Dashboard, each staff SSID was set to "Enterprise with my RADIUS server" and pointed at Purple's cloud RADIUS. Group membership in Microsoft Entra ID set the VLAN for front desk, back office and engineering.

Outcome. Three servers left the patch cycle: the offline root, the issuing CA and the NDES host. The shared password was retired at all 40 sites. A leaver disabled in Entra ID loses WiFi access without anyone visiting a hotel.

Worked example: a university that keeps AD CS where it works

Situation. Lab and library PCs were domain-joined and received certificates through Group Policy autoenrolment. Staff Macs and phones were managed in an MDM outside the domain. Students brought personal devices. The access points were HPE Aruba.

What was done. The university kept AD CS for the domain-joined PCs. It added a managed PKI for MDM-enrolled staff devices instead of building NDES. Students onboarded through the open network and received certificates to personal devices. The RADIUS policy trusted both chains on one SSID, and identity placed each device on the staff or student VLAN.

Outcome. The university built no NDES server. It ran one SSID with two certificate sources and one RADIUS policy. Lab PCs kept the autoenrolment they already had.

Worked example: a retail chain facing a server refresh

Situation. A 300-store chain on Juniper Mist ran its CA on Windows Server 2016. Store handhelds were managed in an MDM. Tills and label printers had no 802.1X supplicant.

What was done. The chain migrated in phases. RADIUS trusted both the old and new chains. The team reissued certificates by MDM group, one region at a time, and then decommissioned the CA. Tills and printers moved to the xPSK network with a key per device.

Outcome. The CA was retired before extended support ends in January 2027. Each store now runs two networks: certificates for handhelds and a key per device for fixed kit.

{"tone":"proof","title":"Proof at scale","text":"McDonald's runs on Purple with 80% fewer IT helpdesk requests. JPMorgan runs staff WiFi on Purple across 5,000 branches."}

What does running AD CS for WiFi certificates involve?

AD CS is the Windows Server role that turns your domain into a certificate authority. Microsoft's AD CS documentation covers the full build. Summarised for WiFi, these are the pieces you operate.

The pieces you run

  • An offline root CA, kept powered off except when it signs a subordinate certificate or a root CRL.
  • One or more enterprise issuing CAs, joined to the domain and holding the certificate templates.
  • A certificate template with the Client Authentication extended key usage for devices, plus a server certificate for the RADIUS server.
  • CRL distribution points, usually HTTP on IIS, published where every RADIUS server can fetch them.
  • NDES plus a connector for any device outside the domain. These are SCEP (RFC 8894) through the Certificate Connector for Microsoft Intune or the Jamf Pro AD CS Connector.
  • A RADIUS server that trusts the chain and checks revocation on every login.

Where AD CS earns its place

AD CS is strongest on a domain-joined Windows fleet. Group Policy autoenrolment issues and renews machine certificates with no user action. If your team already runs the hierarchy well, the marginal cost of WiFi certificates is low. AD CS can also keep CA keys in an HSM you own, which some contracts require.

Where AD CS costs you

The costs gather at the edges of the domain. Every Mac, phone, tablet and Entra-joined laptop needs SCEP through NDES. That adds a server, a connector and a service account to secure. NDES on one host is a single point of failure for enrolment.

Templates carry security risk. SpecterOps' 2021 "Certified Pre-Owned" research showed how misconfigured AD CS templates allow privilege escalation in the domain. Auditing templates becomes part of the job.

Revocation depends on reachability. The RADIUS server must fetch a current CRL from every site. A cloud RADIUS service must reach it from outside your network too.

Finally, the CA lives on a Windows Server release with an end-of-support date. Each date forces a rebuild or a migration.

{"tone":"warning","title":"The outage AD CS estates meet first","text":"An expired or unreachable CRL can stop every EAP-TLS login at once. If RADIUS checks revocation and cannot fetch a current CRL, it rejects valid certificates."}

What does a managed PKI change for your WiFi certificates?

A managed PKI moves the CA, revocation and platform upkeep to a service. With Purple, you keep the parts that carry your identity and device policy. Your MDM still decides which devices get certificates. Your identity provider still decides who is a joiner, mover or leaver. The certificate authority is no longer a server you patch.

How a certificate reaches the network

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Enrolment runs through the MDM you already pay for. MDM setup takes 5 to 10 minutes, once, for the whole organisation. Our comparison of MDM WiFi certificate profiles covers Intune, Jamf Pro, JumpCloud, Kandji, Hexnode, Iru and Addigy.

The private key is generated on the device. Where the hardware allows, you can keep it in the TPM so it cannot be exported. See TPM-backed WiFi certificates. For the choice of enrolment protocol, read SCEP vs ACME for WiFi certificates.

What you change on the access points

You do not need new hardware. Purple is hardware-agnostic across Cisco Meraki, HPE Aruba, Ruckus, Juniper Mist, Ubiquiti UniFi, Cambium, Extreme and Fortinet. On each staff SSID, you set enterprise security and point RADIUS at Purple:

  • Cisco Meraki Dashboard: "Enterprise with my RADIUS server".
  • HPE Aruba Central: the "Enterprise" security level with an external RADIUS server.
  • Ruckus: "802.1X EAP" authentication.
  • Juniper Mist: WPA2 or WPA3 Enterprise (802.1X).
  • Ubiquiti UniFi Network: WPA2 or WPA3 Enterprise with a RADIUS profile.

Follow the support article for your console to set exact values. Do not copy secrets between sites.

What identity adds

Purple's cloud RADIUS checks more than the certificate chain. It ties each connection to an identity in Microsoft Entra ID, Okta or Google Workspace and returns the VLAN for that identity. When someone leaves, Purple revokes access from one console. Whitbread runs segmented staff WiFi on Purple.

The same certificate can also authenticate Passpoint profiles. Passpoint, also called Hotspot 2.0, lets a device join a known network automatically and securely.

What does each option cost to run?

The cost of each option sits in servers, people and outage risk. Certificates themselves are a small part of it.

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The line most estates under-count is the owner. A healthy AD CS needs someone who understands CRL validity periods, template permissions and root renewal. If that person has left, you are already paying the cost as risk.

The second hidden line is the fault that crosses sites. A CRL that expires overnight stops EAP-TLS logins everywhere at once. That turns into a helpdesk queue at every site the next morning.

What changes the answer?

Six conditions move an estate from one lane to the other. Check each one against your own estate before you commit.

Your device mix

Count the devices that will join staff WiFi and classify each one. Domain-joined Windows favours AD CS. Everything else enrols through an MDM, which favours a managed PKI. If more than half sit outside the domain, AD CS needs NDES to reach most of your fleet.

A key-custody policy

Some public-sector and financial contracts require CA keys on infrastructure you operate. If yours does, keep AD CS with an HSM and document the clause. Without such a clause, key custody is a preference, not a requirement.

The RADIUS server you run today

Estates on Microsoft NPS or Cisco ISE often keep AD CS because the two were built together. If you are replacing the RADIUS server anyway, the CA question reopens. Our guide to Cisco ISE alternatives covers that comparison.

A server refresh date

An end-of-support date forces a decision either way. Windows Server 2016 extended support ends in January 2027. If your CA runs on it, you will rebuild or migrate within the next planning cycle. Migrating costs about the same effort as rebuilding and removes the next refresh.

Mergers and multiple domains

Two companies bring two forests and often two CAs. Cross-trusting them is possible but adds work to every RADIUS policy. A single managed PKI behind one identity provider avoids the cross-trust.

Revocation checks need a reachable CRL. Remote venues, pop-up event sites and stores on cellular backhaul make that harder with an on-premises CA. A cloud RADIUS service with managed revocation removes the dependency on your data centre.

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The default is a managed PKI on Purple's secure network, with EAP-TLS on the access points you already own. It fits estates where devices live in an MDM, sites span many networks and nobody owns PKI as a job. Purple runs this across 80,000+ venues in 90 countries.

{"tone":"tip","title":"Your first action this week","text":"Export your WiFi device inventory from your MDM and the domain, and label each device domain-joined, MDM-managed or no supplicant. That one list answers the first three questions in the decision tree."}

Next, pick a pilot group of 20 to 50 staff devices at one site. Push the SCEP profile, point one SSID at Purple's cloud RADIUS and confirm the VLAN each identity lands on. Then expand by MDM group. See how Staff WiFi on the secure network works, read the secure network overview, or compare options in our enterprise WiFi security guide.

Frequently asked questions

Is a managed PKI cheaper to run than AD CS?

Yes, in estates without a dedicated PKI owner. AD CS has no per-certificate charge, but it needs at least three servers once NDES is included. It also needs Windows Server licences, monthly patching and a rebuild at each end-of-support date. The largest cost is the skilled person who keeps CRLs, templates and the offline root healthy. A managed PKI on Purple replaces those lines with a subscription.

Does a managed PKI work with the access points we already own?

Yes. EAP-TLS is an IEEE 802.1X method, so any enterprise SSID that uses an external RADIUS server can carry it. Purple is hardware-agnostic across Cisco Meraki, HPE Aruba, Ruckus, Juniper Mist, Ubiquiti UniFi, Cambium, Extreme and Fortinet. You change the SSID's security setting and RADIUS target in the console you already use. You do not need to replace any hardware.

Can we migrate from AD CS without a WiFi outage?

Yes, if both chains stay trusted during the move. Configure RADIUS to accept certificates from your AD CS chain and the managed chain. Then push the new SCEP profile one MDM group at a time and confirm each group connects. Remove the old profile once the group is stable. Retire the AD CS issuing CA only after the last group has moved and the old certificates have stopped appearing in logs.

Which option gives better audit evidence for ISO 27001 or PCI DSS?

Both can produce evidence for ISO 27001 and PCI DSS audits, but a managed PKI produces it with less assembly. With AD CS, you combine the CA database, template permissions and RADIUS logs yourself. With Purple, authentication records sit against each identity in one console. Purple itself holds ISO 27001 and Cyber Essentials certification. Your auditor still judges your controls, so treat the logs as evidence rather than a certificate of conformity.

Can we keep Microsoft NPS as our RADIUS server?

You can, but then you keep its servers and failure modes too. NPS checks revocation against your published CRLs, so CRL reachability stays your problem at every site. Moving RADIUS to Purple's cloud RADIUS removes the on-premises servers. It also adds identity-based VLAN assignment from Microsoft Entra ID, Okta or Google Workspace. Most estates move RADIUS and PKI together because the two share the same trust chain.

How long does it take to issue the first certificates?

MDM setup takes 5 to 10 minutes, once, for the whole organisation. After that, devices receive certificates at their next MDM check-in. A sensible first step is a pilot of 20 to 50 devices on one SSID at one site. Once the pilot connects and lands on the right VLAN, expand by MDM group. An AD CS build needs the hierarchy, NDES and a connector in place first.

What about devices that cannot hold a certificate?

Put them on the xPSK network. Printers, tills, label printers and many sensors have no 802.1X supplicant, so they cannot use EAP-TLS. On the xPSK network, each device gets its own key. If one device is compromised, you revoke that one key without touching the others. Identity still sets the VLAN, so fixed kit stays segmented from staff devices and from the open network.

Do cloud-only Microsoft Entra ID devices work with AD CS?

Only through NDES and the Intune connector. Group Policy autoenrolment needs a domain, so Entra-joined laptops cannot autoenrol from AD CS. Instead, Intune requests certificates on their behalf over SCEP through NDES and the Certificate Connector for Microsoft Intune. That works, but it adds servers to an estate that has otherwise left the domain. For a cloud-only fleet, a managed PKI on Purple fits the architecture you already run.

Frequently asked questions

Is a managed PKI cheaper to run than AD CS?

Yes, in estates without a dedicated PKI owner. AD CS has no per-certificate charge, but it needs at least three servers once NDES is included. It also needs Windows Server licences, monthly patching and a rebuild at each end-of-support date. The largest cost is the skilled person who keeps CRLs, templates and the offline root healthy. A managed PKI on Purple replaces those lines with a subscription.

Does a managed PKI work with the access points we already own?

Yes. EAP-TLS is an IEEE 802.1X method, so any enterprise SSID that uses an external RADIUS server can carry it. Purple is hardware-agnostic across Cisco Meraki, HPE Aruba, Ruckus, Juniper Mist, Ubiquiti UniFi, Cambium, Extreme and Fortinet. You change the SSID's security setting and RADIUS target in the console you already use. You do not need to replace any hardware.

Can we migrate from AD CS without a WiFi outage?

Yes, if both chains stay trusted during the move. Configure RADIUS to accept certificates from your AD CS chain and the managed chain. Then push the new SCEP profile one MDM group at a time and confirm each group connects. Remove the old profile once the group is stable. Retire the AD CS issuing CA only after the last group has moved and the old certificates have stopped appearing in logs.

Which option gives better audit evidence for ISO 27001 or PCI DSS?

Both can produce evidence for ISO 27001 and PCI DSS audits, but a managed PKI produces it with less assembly. With AD CS, you combine the CA database, template permissions and RADIUS logs yourself. With Purple, authentication records sit against each identity in one console. Purple itself holds ISO 27001 and Cyber Essentials certification. Your auditor still judges your controls, so treat the logs as evidence rather than a certificate of conformity.

Can we keep Microsoft NPS as our RADIUS server?

You can, but then you keep its servers and failure modes too. NPS checks revocation against your published CRLs, so CRL reachability stays your problem at every site. Moving RADIUS to Purple's cloud RADIUS removes the on-premises servers. It also adds identity-based VLAN assignment from Microsoft Entra ID, Okta or Google Workspace. Most estates move RADIUS and PKI together because the two share the same trust chain.

How long does it take to issue the first certificates?

MDM setup takes 5 to 10 minutes, once, for the whole organisation. After that, devices receive certificates at their next MDM check-in. A sensible first step is a pilot of 20 to 50 devices on one SSID at one site. Once the pilot connects and lands on the right VLAN, expand by MDM group. An AD CS build needs the hierarchy, NDES and a connector in place first.

What about devices that cannot hold a certificate?

Put them on the xPSK network. Printers, tills, label printers and many sensors have no 802.1X supplicant, so they cannot use EAP-TLS. On the xPSK network, each device gets its own key. If one device is compromised, you revoke that one key without touching the others. Identity still sets the VLAN, so fixed kit stays segmented from staff devices and from the open network.

Do cloud-only Microsoft Entra ID devices work with AD CS?

Only through NDES and the Intune connector. Group Policy autoenrolment needs a domain, so Entra-joined laptops cannot autoenrol from AD CS. Instead, Intune requests certificates on their behalf over SCEP through NDES and the Certificate Connector for Microsoft Intune. That works, but it adds servers to an estate that has otherwise left the domain. For a cloud-only fleet, a managed PKI on Purple fits the architecture you already run.

Turn this guide into a plan for your estate

Tell us about your sites and the hardware you run. A Purple engineer maps Purple Access on top of it with you, and you keep the plan.

  1. Book a demoTell us what runs on your WiFi today, and a Purple network engineer maps it with you.
  2. Map your SSIDs onto threeOpen, secure and xPSK, on the access points you already own. You leave with the plan.
  3. Prove it on one site firstJudge the result on tickets and audit evidence, then roll out.

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