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Secure network: certificates, identity and PasspointAuthentication

PEAP-MSCHAPv2 to EAP-TLS: a migration plan for staff WiFi

Plan and run a move from PEAP-MSCHAPv2 to EAP-TLS on staff WiFi in five phases, with no flag day and no new access points. You will be able to set entry conditions, choose a side-by-side pattern, run go or no-go checks per wave, roll back one wave at a time, and prove the migration is finished.

14 min read

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You can move PEAP-MSCHAPv2 to EAP-TLS in five phases without a cutover day when every staff device is managed or moved to its own key, and RADIUS accepts both methods during the switch. Access points need no new hardware, because 802.1X relays any EAP method. Certificates arrive through MDM, sites cut over in waves, and PEAP switches off last.

What changes when you move staff WiFi from PEAP-MSCHAPv2 to EAP-TLS?

Start with the terms.

  • 802.1X is the IEEE standard that lets an access point hand authentication to a RADIUS server.
  • RADIUS is the server that accepts or rejects each device and returns its VLAN (virtual network segment).
  • PEAP-MSCHAPv2 checks a username and password inside a TLS tunnel.
  • EAP-TLS, defined in RFC 5216 and updated for TLS 1.3 in RFC 9190, checks a certificate on both sides. No password crosses the air.

What changes

  • The credential. A password becomes a device certificate, issued through your mobile device management (MDM) platform.
  • The client profile. MDM pushes a WiFi profile set to EAP-TLS, which replaces the PEAP profile.
  • The RADIUS policy. It accepts both methods during the move, then EAP-TLS only.
  • The offboarding process. You revoke an identity instead of resetting a shared password.

What stays the same

  • Access points and firmware. The access points keep their current firmware.
  • The SSID security mode. It stays WPA2-Enterprise or WPA3-Enterprise.
  • Your VLAN design and switch configuration. Identity still sets the VLAN.
  • The SSID name. It stays the same if you run both methods on one SSID.

The end state is one staff SSID on the secure network, running EAP-TLS only. Every device holds a certificate tied to an identity in Microsoft Entra ID, Okta or Google Workspace. PEAP is disabled and shared service accounts are deleted.

Why move now? PEAP-MSCHAPv2 is only as safe as each device's check of the server certificate. A device that skips the check hands its MSCHAPv2 exchange to a rogue access point. Attackers can crack that exchange offline. Windows adds a deadline: Microsoft documents that Credential Guard breaks single sign-on for MSCHAPv2-based WiFi. Credential Guard is on by default on eligible devices from Windows 11 version 22H2.

{"tone":"warning","title":"The risk that bites","text":"Devices you never counted. Shared handhelds, kitchen tablets and printers on a PEAP service account cannot take a certificate, and they drop off at cutover unless you move them to xPSK first."}

What has to be true before phase 1 starts?

Five things must be in place before any device moves. If one is missing, the plan stalls at the pilot.

  1. An inventory built from RADIUS logs, not the asset register. Export every account and device that authenticated with PEAP over the last 30 days. Sort each device class into one of three paths: EAP-TLS, xPSK or retire. xPSK gives each device or person its own pre-shared key, so shared passwords disappear even where certificates cannot go.
  2. An MDM path for every operating system. Microsoft Intune, Jamf Pro, Kandji or JumpCloud must reach every in-scope laptop, cell phone and tablet. For JumpCloud specifics, see JumpCloud and 802.1X. A Windows PC with no MDM enrollment is a phase 1 finding, not a phase 4 surprise.
  3. A certificate authority your MDM can reach. Devices request certificates through SCEP (Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol) or PKCS. Set renewal to automatic before you issue the first certificate.
  4. A RADIUS server certificate that clients trust. The WiFi profile must pin the server name and the issuing CA. Without that pin, you rebuild the weakness you are removing.
  5. IdP groups that map to VLANs. Decide which groups land on which segment before any device moves. Retail staff, managers and back-office devices each get their own VLAN.

Then name an owner and an exit test for each phase. Agree the rollback in writing.

What are the phases of a PEAP to EAP-TLS migration, in order?

The plan has five phases. PEAP stays accepted until the fifth. Each phase ends on a test you read from a log or an MDM report, never on a calendar date.

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How does each phase run?

Phase 1: inventory and trust

Nothing live changes in phase 1. Pull the PEAP logs and build the device list. Confirm the trust chain from the RADIUS server certificate to its root CA. The exit test is a device list with no row marked "unknown".

Phase 2: certificates to devices

Stage trust and certificates across the estate before any profile swap. With Microsoft Intune, the trusted certificate and SCEP or PKCS profiles go out everywhere. The EAP-TLS WiFi profile follows site by site. Apple profiles work differently, as the steps below show. Connecting your MDM to Purple takes five to ten minutes, once, for the whole organization.

Phase 3: pilot site

Pick one site that runs every operating system in your estate. It also needs a manager who will report problems quickly. Swap the WiFi profile there and leave PEAP accepted on RADIUS. Run the pilot for seven days.

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Phase 4: wave cutover

Group the remaining sites into waves and run the go or no-go check before each one. Keep waves small enough that one rollback owner can cover them.

Worked scenario: a 40-store retailer on Cisco Meraki. Staff laptops and cell phones sat in Intune. Sixty handheld scanners shared one PEAP service account. Phase 1 found the scanners in the RADIUS logs, not in the asset register. The team moved them to xPSK, one key per scanner, before the first wave. The stores then cut over in four waves of 10. The measurable outcome: PEAP authentications reached zero after wave four, and the team deleted the service account in phase 5.

Phase 5: decommission PEAP

Wait for 30 consecutive days at zero PEAP across the estate. Then disable PEAP in the RADIUS policy and save the old policy for rollback. Delete shared service accounts, retire any legacy SSID and remove leftover PEAP profiles from MDM.

How do PEAP and EAP-TLS run side by side through cutover?

Choose one of two patterns before phase 2. The choice depends on whether your RADIUS server changes too. An SSID points at one set of RADIUS servers, so it cannot route requests by EAP method.

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Cutover for a wave is three actions:

  1. Assign the EAP-TLS WiFi profile to the wave's sites.
  2. Watch the RADIUS log for 48 hours.
  3. Block PEAP for those sites once the log is clean.

Run the decision tree below before every wave. It takes minutes and saves a site-wide outage.

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How do you roll back a wave without a full outage?

Roll back per wave, never across the estate. The one exception is a wrong server certificate or CA, because that breaks every site at once. Agree on the triggers in phase 1. Typical triggers are a whole device class offline, a failure rate above your agreed limit, or a property manager escalation.

The rollback action depends on the pattern:

  • Same SSID, both methods. Re-allow PEAP for the wave's sites and re-push the PEAP profile to the affected devices. The access points do not change.
  • New SSID, new RADIUS. Unassign the new profile. Devices fall back to the legacy SSID, which is still broadcasting.

Worked scenario: a 12-hotel group on HPE Aruba. The group ran the new SSID pattern alongside Microsoft NPS. In wave two, front-desk PCs failed at sign-in. Each PC held a certificate issued to the person, but the PCs need network access before anyone signs in. The team unassigned the new profile in one change, and the PCs rejoined the legacy SSID. Next, the team issued device (machine) certificates and re-ran the go or no-go check. The measurable outcome: guest check-in stayed online, and the wave passed on its second attempt.

How do you know the move to EAP-TLS is finished?

The move is finished when the logs prove it, not when the last wave closes. Look for six signs:

  • Zero PEAP authentications across the estate for 30 consecutive days.
  • PEAP disabled in the RADIUS policy, with the change recorded.
  • Shared service accounts deleted in the IdP.
  • The legacy SSID removed from every access point.
  • A departure test passed. Disable a test account in the IdP and confirm the device loses access, as set out in the joiner, mover and leaver process.
  • An evidence pack filed: the RADIUS log export, the MDM certificate report and the change records. This is evidence for the access control reviews in your ISO 27001 and PCI DSS audits.
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What fails in the field during an EAP-TLS migration?

The same seven failures recur across organizations. Each one is cheaper to prevent in phase 1 than to fix in phase 4.

  • No server name pinned. Devices still trust any certificate from the CA, so a rogue server can impersonate yours. Pin the name in every profile.
  • No automatic renewal. Certificates issued in the same week expire in the same week. Without renewal, the organization fails on that date.
  • User certificates on shared PCs. Front-desk and POS terminal PCs need device certificates, because they must join WiFi before anyone signs in.
  • Fragmented RADIUS packets. EAP-TLS exchanges are larger than PEAP exchanges. Long certificate chains fragment, and some firewalls drop fragmented UDP. Keep the chain short and test the RADIUS path.
  • Clock drift. A device with the wrong date sees a valid certificate as "not yet valid". Check time sync on kiosks and handhelds.
  • Identity mismatch. If the certificate subject does not match an IdP identity, the device lands on the default VLAN. Test VLAN placement in the pilot.
  • Two profiles for one SSID. A device holding both profiles may keep using PEAP. Remove the old profile in the same push.

Where Purple fits in a PEAP to EAP-TLS migration

Purple Access runs three networks on the access points you already own. The open network carries guests through a captive portal. The secure network runs EAP-TLS on cloud RADIUS, with identity from Microsoft Entra ID, Okta or Google Workspace. It also supports Passpoint (Hotspot 2.0), the standard that joins trusted devices automatically. The xPSK network gives each device its own key. That is where your scanners, tablets, and printers go when they cannot hold a certificate.

Purple is hardware-agnostic. It works as a cloud overlay on Cisco Meraki, HPE Aruba, Ruckus, Juniper Mist, Ubiquiti UniFi, Cambium, Extreme, and Fortinet. There is no rip and replace. You change the RADIUS server on the SSID, and the access points relay the rest.

{"items":[{"value":"80,000+","label":"live venues","note":"Purple data"},{"value":"90","label":"countries","note":"Purple data"},{"value":"5,000","label":"JPMorgan branches on Purple staff WiFi","note":"Purple data"},{"value":"80%","label":"fewer IT helpdesk requests at McDonald's","note":"Purple data"}]}
{"tone":"proof","text":"JPMorgan runs staff WiFi on Purple across 5,000 branches, and Whitbread runs segmented staff WiFi on Purple."}

See how Purple runs staff WiFi on the secure network. For the wider design, read the pillar on the secure network: certificates, identity and Passpoint and Purple's enterprise WiFi security guide.

Frequently asked questions

Do we need new access points to migrate PEAP to EAP-TLS?

No. The access point relays 802.1X traffic and does not care which EAP method runs inside it. Your SSID stays on WPA2-Enterprise or WPA3-Enterprise. The only change on the access points is the RADIUS server address, and only if you move to cloud RADIUS. Firmware, VLAN design, and switch configuration stay as they are. The work happens in your MDM, your IdP groups, and your RADIUS policy.

Does this migration work on Cisco Meraki, HPE Aruba, Ruckus, Juniper Mist and Ubiquiti UniFi?

Yes. Each console points an Enterprise (802.1X) SSID at an external RADIUS server, and that is all EAP-TLS needs. In Meraki Dashboard, set the association requirement to Enterprise with my RADIUS server. Aruba Central, the Mist portal, SmartZone or RUCKUS One, and UniFi Network each have an equivalent setting. Purple also runs on Cambium, Extreme, and Fortinet, so mixed estates follow one plan.

How long does a PEAP to EAP-TLS migration take?

Your exit tests set the calendar, not the configuration work. The pilot runs for seven days, every wave needs seven clean days, and decommission waits for 30 days at zero PEAP. Connecting your MDM to Purple takes five to ten minutes, once, for the whole organization. Enrollment coverage is the variable. An estate where every device already sits in Microsoft Intune or Jamf Pro moves faster than one with unmanaged devices.

What happens to devices that cannot hold a certificate?

They move to the xPSK network before cutover, each with its own key. Handheld scanners, kitchen tablets, printers and some kiosks cannot enroll in MDM or store a client certificate. A shared PEAP service account is the usual workaround, and it is the weakest point in the estate. One key per device means you can revoke a single scanner without touching the others. Identity still sets the VLAN.

Can we keep Microsoft NPS running during the move?

Yes. Run the new SSID pattern. The legacy SSID stays on NPS with PEAP, and a new staff SSID points at Purple cloud RADIUS with EAP-TLS only. Devices move wave by wave as their profiles change. The legacy SSID remains your rollback until the final wave closes. Retire it and NPS together in phase 5, once the logs show 30 days without a PEAP authentication.

Does EAP-TLS give us evidence for PCI DSS and ISO 27001 audits?

It gives you stronger evidence for both. Every authentication ties a certificate to a named identity, with no shared password to rotate or leak. Export the RADIUS logs, the MDM certificate report and your change records as an evidence pack. Purple holds ISO 27001 certification and Cyber Essentials, which supports your supplier due diligence. Your auditor still assesses your own controls, so file the pack before the audit window opens.

How does Purple compare with Cisco ISE for this migration?

Purple runs RADIUS in the cloud, so there are no appliances to size, patch or license per node. Cisco ISE gives deep policy control on Cisco estates, but it needs on-premises or virtual infrastructure to run. Purple is hardware-agnostic across eight vendors and takes identity from Microsoft Entra ID, Okta or Google Workspace. For a side-by-side view, read Cisco ISE alternatives for WiFi authentication.

What does it cost to run both methods in parallel?

Running PEAP and EAP-TLS side by side costs nothing in hardware, because your access points relay both. The costs sit in software you may already hold: your MDM, a certificate authority reachable over SCEP or PKCS, and the Purple secure network subscription. Ask Purple for a quote against your venue count and the networks you need: open, secure and xPSK.

Frequently asked questions

Do we need new access points to migrate PEAP to EAP-TLS?

No. The access point relays 802.1X traffic and does not care which EAP method runs inside it. Your SSID stays on WPA2-Enterprise or WPA3-Enterprise. The only change on the access points is the RADIUS server address, and only if you move to cloud RADIUS. Firmware, VLAN design and switch configuration stay as they are. The work happens in your MDM, your IdP groups and your RADIUS policy.

Does this migration work on Cisco Meraki, HPE Aruba, Ruckus, Juniper Mist and Ubiquiti UniFi?

Yes. Each console points an Enterprise (802.1X) SSID at an external RADIUS server, and that is all EAP-TLS needs. In Meraki Dashboard, set the association requirement to Enterprise with my RADIUS server. Aruba Central, the Mist portal, SmartZone or RUCKUS One, and UniFi Network each have an equivalent setting. Purple also runs on Cambium, Extreme and Fortinet, so mixed estates follow one plan.

How long does a PEAP to EAP-TLS migration take?

Your exit tests set the calendar, not the configuration work. The pilot runs for seven days, every wave needs seven clean days, and decommission waits for 30 days at zero PEAP. Connecting your MDM to Purple takes five to ten minutes, once, for the whole organization. Enrollment coverage is the variable. An estate where every device already sits in Microsoft Intune or Jamf Pro moves faster than one with unmanaged devices.

What happens to devices that cannot hold a certificate?

They move to the xPSK network before cutover, each with its own key. Handheld scanners, kitchen tablets, printers and some kiosks cannot enroll in MDM or store a client certificate. A shared PEAP service account is the usual workaround, and it is the weakest point in the estate. One key per device means you can revoke a single scanner without touching the others. Identity still sets the VLAN.

Can we keep Microsoft NPS running during the move?

Yes. Run the new SSID pattern. The legacy SSID stays on NPS with PEAP, and a new staff SSID points at Purple cloud RADIUS with EAP-TLS only. Devices move wave by wave as their profiles change. The legacy SSID remains your rollback until the final wave closes. Retire it and NPS together in phase 5, once the logs show 30 days without a PEAP authentication.

Does EAP-TLS give us evidence for PCI DSS and ISO 27001 audits?

It gives you stronger evidence for both. Every authentication ties a certificate to a named identity, with no shared password to rotate or leak. Export the RADIUS logs, the MDM certificate report and your change records as an evidence pack. Purple holds ISO 27001 certification and Cyber Essentials, which supports your vendor due diligence. Your auditor still assesses your own controls, so file the pack before the audit window opens.

How does Purple compare with Cisco ISE for this migration?

Purple runs RADIUS in the cloud, so there are no appliances to size, patch or license per node. Cisco ISE gives deep policy control on Cisco estates, but it needs on-premises or virtual infrastructure to run. Purple is hardware-agnostic across eight vendors and takes identity from Microsoft Entra ID, Okta or Google Workspace. For a side-by-side view, read [Cisco ISE alternatives for WiFi authentication](guide:cisco-ise-alternatives).

What does it cost to run both methods in parallel?

Running PEAP and EAP-TLS side by side costs nothing in hardware, because your access points relay both. The costs sit in software you may already hold: your MDM, a certificate authority reachable over SCEP or PKCS, and the Purple secure network subscription. Ask Purple for a quote against your venue count and the networks you need: open, secure and xPSK.

Turn this guide into a plan for your estate

Tell us about your sites and the hardware you run. A Purple engineer maps Purple Access on top of it with you, and you keep the plan.

  1. Book a demoTell us what runs on your WiFi today, and a Purple network engineer maps it with you.
  2. Map your SSIDs onto threeOpen, secure and xPSK, on the access points you already own. You leave with the plan.
  3. Prove it on one site firstJudge the result on tickets and audit evidence, then roll out.

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